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Given Today’s New Wave of Protectionism, 
is Antitrust Law the Last Hope for Preserving 
a Free Global Economy or Another Nail in 
Free Trade’s Coffin? 
 
BY ALLISON MURRAY* 
INTRODUCTION 
Trump. Le Pen. Brexit. Protectionist rhetoric has consumed the 
international political stage. Western countries and their leaders were 
once the drivers of economic globalization, relying on free-market 
speeches and the prospect of removing trade barriers to appeal to their 
constituents.1 They pointed fingers at other countries engaging in or 
encouraging protectionist behavior and challenged them in the court of 
public opinion and elsewhere to stop their antics. The “our country first, 
world trade after” mentality was widely politicized and vilified. Now, it 
seems that Western national leaders are championing the very 
protectionism that they once criticized.2 
Although a system of truly free world trade has never been 
perfected, past world leaders have eliminated most of the protectionist 
trade mechanisms that once ran rampant in the international economy. 
They did so by implementing multilateral and bilateral trade agreements.  
These webs of agreements have bolstered decades of support for free 
trade, or at least some version of it. By and large, tariff policies and other 
forms of protectionism were either eliminated or dramatically reduced. 
 
* Allison Murray, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Juris Doctor, May 2019. Special thanks to 
Professor David Kesselman and to the ILR team of editors and staff.  
 1. See JEFFREY L. CHIDESTER & PAUL KENGOR, REAGAN’S LEGACY IN A WORLD 
TRANSFORMED 12-13, 23 (2015). 
 2. Robert Plummer, Protectionism: Is it on the way back?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-18104024. 
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Now, as we have seen in the media, when a government imposes a tariff, 
it becomes a rather extreme political statement which sends a shockwave 
of significant global consequences. 
Protectionism did not end when the age of overbearing tariff policies 
did, despite then-leaders’ best efforts to vilify it. Rather, the end of the 
tariff era forced nations to achieve protectionist goals through more subtle 
trade vehicles, like antitrust law.3 So, the recent resurgence of 
protectionist rhetoric should mean that these subtle trade vehicles, 
including antitrust law, will be relied on more heavily. It is a fear of many 
that antitrust law may become overused and inequitably applied to 
achieve and combat protectionist aims. 
Notwithstanding the recent uptick in tariff threats, it is unlikely that 
all Western leaders will revamp or terminate the trade agreements set 
forth by their predecessors and bring back the kinds of tariff policies that 
once existed in their place. Although in the United States (“U.S.”), 
President Trump recently imposed tariffs on steel imports, it appears that 
his intent is to limit this behavior to a specific industry rather than institute 
a widespread policy favoring the use of tariffs generally.4 To remedy bad 
behavior in a specialized set of industries is not to instigate a global 
paradigm shift. This purpose is underscored by his use of the national 
security exemption, which is largely interpreted as being used for 
individual situations rather than general policy schemes.5 Many still hope 
that his course of action will be retracted and is merely a strong 
negotiation tactic. However, there is no doubt that Trump is far more 
comfortable than past leaders with subverting the status quo on trade 
relations. 
Trump is not the only high-profile leader flirting with staunch 
protectionism. Western leaders in the E.U. appear to be growing more 
comfortable than their predecessors with considering similar policies. 
However, Western lawmakers themselves do not seem as persuaded by 
the statements of their leadership. The general sentiment among 
international policymakers is that there has been too much political 
wherewithal spent on loosening international trade barriers to take actions 
 
 3. See Anu Bradford, Robert J. Jackson & Jonathon Zytnick, Is EU Antitrust Enforcement a 
Tool for Protectionism? An Empirical Analysis, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165 (2018). 
 4. See Pete Kasperowicz, How Trump’s Steel Tariffs Could Break the WTO, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Mar. 6, 2018, 9:00 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/how-trumps-steel-
tariffs-could-break-the-wto/article/2650771; Ana Swanson, Trump to Impose Sweeping Steel and 
Aluminum Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/01/business
/trump-tariffs.html. 
 5. See Swanson, supra note 4; Kasperowicz, supra note 4. 
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that could counteract that progress.6 Presidential actions taken because of 
dissatisfaction with current global trade relations aside, a complete 
overhaul of trade agreements may be too daunting and difficult a task, 
especially absent ample political support in legislative bodies. 
Given the anticipated continuation of cooperative trade agreements 
and the proliferation of protectionist rhetoric as the new norm of public 
opinion, leaders will be forced to rely on existing avenues to meet 
protectionist aims. Again, we find ourselves relying squarely on antitrust 
law, the more subtle and widely accepted mechanism of restricting trade, 
to address perceived inequities. In the words of the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”), “once formal trade barriers come down, other 
issues become more important.”7 Among the important issues lies 
antitrust law. Antitrust and competition laws can form a subtle trade 
barrier resulting in the imposition of tariff-like measures. 
Antitrust law can be enforced to reach protectionist aims and to 
combat them. It is a tool that allows nations to achieve individual 
protectionist aims without undermining the future of trade between 
countries and the cooperative framework underpinning the relatively 
delicate global free trade enjoyed today. However, the perception of 
enforcement of antitrust laws as an abusive and solely protectionist 
mechanism may cause the death of even the smallest semblance of 
international free trade that remains in the international marketplace 
today.   
This paper explores how the near-term enforcement of antitrust and 
competition laws may be either the last hope for preserving aims toward 
a free global economy or the final nail in free trade’s coffin. We will begin 
by examining the background of antitrust and competition laws, 
explaining the goals and economic theories at the heart of the laws, 
including the myriad of criticisms. Next, we will take a general view of 
the prevalence of competition laws in the world market, revealing the 
differences in underlying theory and enforcement by the top three players 
on the international trade stage. This paper will finish with the subject 
most at the center of the recent rise of protectionist rhetoric: the 
perception of unfair enforcement of antitrust laws among the United 
States, the European Union, and China. 
 
 6. See Swanson, supra note 4; Kasperowicz, supra note 4. 
 7. Investment, Competition, Procurement, Simpler Procedures, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey3_e.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2018).   
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I. BACKGROUND OF ANTITRUST LAW 
It is no great revelation that trade has become increasingly global. 
However, it is nowhere near the true, theoretical conception of free trade 
contemplated by economic theorists. In that world of perfect free trade, 
businesses would “enter and exit markets instantly and without cost,” no 
single firm would be “large enough to influence prices by altering 
output,” and any business that “tried to charge more than its costs would 
be undercut by another [competitor].”8 The efficiency of this perfectly 
competitive environment would know no borders and require no 
government enforcement. 
Of course, such a perfect world does not exist. Firms can become 
large enough to influence output and prices, businesses can collude 
amongst themselves to edge out a new market entrant, and the firms 
engaging in these business practices could suffer no or minimal 
repercussions from the market.9  “A market is not politically neutral; its 
existence creates economic power which one actor can use against 
another.”10 
The economic inefficiencies that plague the real world have caused 
national lawmakers, especially those in less developed economies, to 
pursue nationalist policies to protect their national industries.11 These 
“economic nationalists . . . frequently regard trade negatively, believing 
it to be destructive of traditional values.”12 They recognize that under 
reasonably certain circumstances, namely where large economies and 
monopolists can exploit their market positions, free and unregulated trade 
may actually be more harmful than beneficial.13 
To protect their national markets from such realities, lawmakers 
adopt antitrust laws. These laws serve to promote and preserve fair 
competition in an otherwise free market.14 They “ensure that the market 
is free to allocate resources in response to demand . . . free from restraints 
imposed by private parties.”15 Without such private “restraints,” 
resources are certain to be allocated more efficiently by maximizing 
 
 8. EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 
(Hart Publ’g 2d ed. 2011). 
 9. Id. at 4. 
 10. ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 23 (1987). 
 11. Id. at 113. 
 12. Id. at 172. 
 13. Id. at 179. 
 14. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism: 
The Need for Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 393, 394 (1994). 
 15. Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust, and Trade Issues: Similarities, Differences and Relationships, 
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1995).   
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aggregate national wealth,16 while still providing nations with some 
control and protection from firms engaging in foul play. This adoption of 
antitrust law was long regarded as a solution that enabled the best of both 
worlds; it was thought to be a win-win for nations wanting to compete on 
the international economic stage without giving up their sovereign ability 
to penalize those that attempt to take advantage of such an open economic 
market.17 
The formation and enforcement of national antitrust laws has 
become a quite prominent trend internationally.18 Nearly all countries that 
are, purport to be, or aim to be major players in the global economy have 
adopted some form of domestic competition law. Since the 1890s, the 
amount of “gross domestic product (“GDP”) in countries with antitrust 
enforcement rose from less than 20 percent to over 95 percent.”19  Over 
120 nations have adopted antitrust laws into their domestic legal systems, 
and nearly 20% of these nations have adopted these laws in the last fifteen 
years.20 
II. CRITICISM OF ANTITRUST LAW 
Although antitrust laws have been widely adopted, the laws are not 
without criticism. 
A. Ambiguity in the Laws 
Many critics of antitrust law claim that the laws themselves are 
“couched in vague, indefinable terms, permitting the Administration and 
the courts to avoid defining in advance what a ‘monopolistic’ crime is 
and what it is not.”21 These critics claim that antitrust laws rely on 
“deliberate vagueness and ex-post facto rulings” rather than “clear 
definitions . . .  known in advance and discoverable by a jury after due 
legal process,” which clearly calls into question their efficacy.22 The 
vagueness and lack of clear definitions for the concepts at issue in 
antitrust law have caused significant discussion in academic circles: 
Today, courts appear to be confused about whether market power 
and monopoly power are similar or distinct concepts . . . Supreme Court 
 
 16. Schoenbaum, supra note 14, at 394. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See generally, Pierre Cremieux & Edward A. Snyder, Enforcement of Anticollusion Laws 
Against Domestic and Foreign Firms, 59 J.L. & ECON. 775 (2016). 
 19. Id. at 777. 
 20. Id. at 776-78. 
 21. Murray N. Rothbard, Abolish Antitrust Laws, MISES INST. (May 25, 2010), 
https://mises.org/library/abolish-antitrust-laws. 
 22. Id. 
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opinions demonstrate a marked inconsistency as to whether market power 
and monopoly power are similar or distinct concepts. We can find no 
Supreme Court opinion that contrasts the terms “market power” and 
“monopoly power” deliberately and explicitly, i.e., that finds the 
existence of one but not the other. . . . Other Supreme Court opinions also 
appear to treat market power and monopoly power as identical concepts. 
Despite these references, however, the Supreme Court, in other 
cases, seems to have articulated standards for “monopoly power” and 
“market power” that, at least linguistically, are incompatible. In NCAA v. 
Board of Regents, the Court defined “market power” as “the ability to 
raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market.” 
By contrast, the Supreme Court has consistently defined “monopoly 
power,” at least for section two cases, in accordance with the definition 
articulated in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.—i.e., as 
“the power to control prices or exclude competition.” Strictly construed, 
the Court’s language appears to require a higher burden of proof to 
establish “market power” than to demonstrate “monopoly power,” 
because proof of a defendant’s ability to exclude competition would not 
suffice to demonstrate the existence of “market power.”23 
The varied and unpredictable scope of what constitutes a “market” 
is perhaps the clearest example that critics use to highlight antitrust law 
as muddied and inconsistent. Market definitions are suggested by the 
parties to the proceedings and are presumably skewed toward whatever 
position the suggesting party takes in the dispute. The court either adopts 
one of these definitions or, if entirely unpersuaded, creates a new one that 
is more fitting to the situation at hand. Often, the court receives criticism 
for using too narrow or too broad of a definition.24 Most importantly, 
while the court requires some rationale behind the definitions proposed 
by the parties, there is no preset or standard for the scope of market 
definitions. 
This largely affects the landscape of antitrust law because whatever 
market definition is adopted by the court can substantially affect the 
court’s findings. For example, the European Union (“E.U.”), in a recent 
investigation of Google, claimed that Google had dominated the market 
and abused fair competition laws.25 The E.U. authorities defined the 
 
 23. Thomas Krattenmaker, Robert Lande & Steven Salop, Monopoly Power and Market 
Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 246-47 (1987) (footnotes and citations omitted). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, Protecting Competition or Competitors? – Europe’s Pursuit of 
Silicon Valley, OPEN POLITICAL ECON. NETWORK: BLOG (Dec. 5, 2016), http://
www.opennetwork.net/protecting-competition/. 
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relevant product market as the Android operating system.26 Naturally, 
because the operating system was considered “its own market” and 
Google obtained control over 100% of the operating system, the court 
found that Google maintained a monopoly.27 Had that relevant product 
market been characterized by the court more broadly, perhaps as cell 
phone operating systems or as online shopping forums, Google probably 
would not have been found to have the requisite market control required 
to be a monopolist.28 That ruling, as with many cases, hinged entirely on 
the scope of the market definition being applied, leaving behind the 
uncertainty that had the market definition been broader, the court perhaps 
would have ruled the opposite way. 
B. Antitrust’s Competing Goals 
Especially in the U.S., a criticism of antitrust is that the goal of 
preserving competition in economic markets, the most intuitive and 
obvious goal of enacting competition laws, has taken a backseat to a 
different goal set by the legislature: consumer protection.29 It is argued 
that the introduction of a consumer welfare standard has led to 
inconsistent enforcement, as it is a contradictory goal to preserving 
competition.30 
At some level, consumer protection and preservation of competition 
through antitrust laws appear to have consistent effects. Economists and 
laypersons alike seem to understand the concept that “monopolies lead to 
high prices, while competition in the form of a marketplace with many 
sellers drives prices down.”31 It is a matter of basic supply and demand. 
As low prices are beneficial to consumers, why wouldn’t consumers be 
inherently protected by laws preserving a larger supply and more 
competitors? As with many economic concepts that rely on unattainably 
perfect rational behaviors, there are real-world exceptions. 
There are many sets of circumstances in which the application of 
antitrust laws to preserve competition in the market may actually hurt 
 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Surely, we can think of various other companies—Apple, Amazon—who are equally if 
not more dominant than Google in the “cell phone operating systems” or “online shopping” 
markets. 
 29. See generally Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV 2253 
(2013). 
 30. See generally id. 
 31. Id. at 2263. 
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consumers.32 Among these circumstances are the following: (1) the 
maintenance of “low prices for ‘bads,’”33 a term for products that are 
deemed to have negative consequences on society, like tobacco; (2) “low 
prices for status goods”;34 and (3) “the pursuit for innovation in durables 
and fashion goods.”35 After all, a consumer could benefit from a large 
company lowering its prices, regardless of whether the  company’s 
purpose in doing so is to undercut the competition and force its competing 
businesses out of the market.36 That company is clearly utilizing an 
anticompetitive and monopolistic tactic, but the lowered price would 
benefit the consumer. Advocates of antitrust laws assume that the next 
course of action for a monopolist would be to increase its prices to the 
detriment of its consumers once the company is the only provider of its 
product, but it is possible that a company would not elect that course of 
action. It is possible, although improbable, that the consumer in this 
scenario would never be harmed by the company’s anticompetitive 
conduct, therefore making consumers better off without the intervention 
of antitrust laws. 
U.S. antitrust laws at least purport to concern themselves with long-
term competition in the market rather than short-term consumer benefit. 
However, recent case law suggests that even calling “preservation of 
long-term competition” the goal of the law is debatable. The U.S. 
Supreme Court in Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp. ruled that “predatory price cutting is not unlawful unless the 
predator has a reasonable prospect of recouping his investment from 
supracompetitive profits.”37 This ruling insulated certain kinds of 
anticompetitive behavior so long as the behavior does not result in a 
reasonable possibility of harm to consumers. While the ruling attempted 
to address the above example, to many, the Court appeared to be 
struggling to maintain a balance between preserving competition and 
protecting consumers, which solidifies the criticism that consumer 
protection, a concept that can be at direct odds with perfect competition, 
is treated as one of the dual aims of the law itself.   
 
 32. Barak Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
133, 151 (2010). 
 33. The reference to “bads” describes products that the author deems to be bad for society, 
e.g., tobacco. The argument here is that low prices for bad products encourage consumers to 
purchase the products, even though they may ultimately be unhealthy or harmful to consumers. See 
Orbach, supra note 32, at 151. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Donald J. Boudreaux & Thomas J. Dilorenzo, The Protectionist Roots of Antitrust, 6 REV. 
AUSTRIAN ECON. 81, 83 (1993). 
 37. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 254 (1993). 
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C. Antitrust: Isn’t It Just Protectionism on its Face? 
Closer to the critical point of this paper, another popular criticism of 
antitrust law is that the laws themselves are inherently protectionist.38 
Trade protectionism is a “theory, practice, or system of fostering or 
developing domestic industries by protecting them from foreign 
competition.”39 Protectionism is “a politically motivated defensive 
measure.”40 Economics experts agree that “in the short run, it works. But, 
it is very destructive in the long term.”41 While preserving the country’s 
competitive abilities for a short period, protectionism eventually makes 
the country engaged in protectionist policies and its industries “less 
competitive in international trade.”42 The more inward a country focuses, 
the more coddled and inefficient its markets and domestic companies 
become. In addition, surrounding countries will retaliate with 
protectionist policies, further thwarting the efficiencies gained from a free 
trade economy and its attendant benefits like downward price pressure 
and availability of goods for consumers. 
Protectionist trade measures characteristically include tariffs, 
subsidies, quotas, and currency valuation activities.43 In the U.S., 
economists have argued that the Great Depression of the 1930s was 
deepened by the highly protectionist policies. During that time, the U.S. 
maintained the largest tariff rates of that century.44 They were intended to 
prop up the national industries that were struggling in light of the 
country’s poor economic health.45 Counterintuitive as it was, the very 
policies implemented to battle the poor national economy and to retain 
domestic jobs appeared to worsen the problem.46   
 
 38. Boudreaux & Dilorenzo, supra note 36, at 93. 
 39. Protectionism, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/protectionism (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2018). 
 40. Kimberly Amadeo, Trade Protectionism and Its Methods with Examples, Pros and Cons, 
THE BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-trade-protectionism-3305896 (last updated 
Jul. 31, 2018). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id; see also Arye L. Hillman, Protectionist Policies as the Regulations of International 
Industry, 67 PUB. CHOICE 101, 103 (1990). 
 44. See Sarah Gardner & Scott Tong, The American Protectionism Bill that Made the Great 
Depression Worse, MARKETPLACE (Aug. 24, 2017, 2:14 PM), https://www.marketplace.org
/2017/08/24/sustainability/trade-stories-globalization-and-backlash/what-was-one-worst-pieces-
us-legislation; Bruce Bartlett, The Truth about Trade in History, CATO INSTIT.: COMMENT. (July 
1, 1998) https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/truth-about-trade-history. 
 45. Martin Armstrong, Did Tariffs Cause the Great Depression?, ARMSTRONG ECON.: BLOG 
(July 9, 2018), https://www.armstrongeconomics.com/world-news/sovereign-debt-crisis/did-
tariffs-cause-great-depression/.  
 46. See Bartlett, supra note 44. 
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Critics of antitrust law contend that protectionism was the main 
reason behind the creation of antitrust laws. In the U.S., small farmers 
were being underpriced by larger, more efficient farms.47 Antitrust laws 
were enacted to protect those underperforming farmers from the lower-
priced competitors.48  Critics claim that the antitrust laws artificially 
stunted the market efficiency of the larger firms and, presumably, the 
technological advances that such efficiency would have driven in the 
markets, and thereby stunted the true value of competition rather than 
promoting it.49 
These critics appear to greatly oversimplify the issues. It is true that 
antitrust laws do superficially disrupt the market, like any form of 
regulation would, despite their avowed purpose to avoid market 
disruptions. Antitrust enforcement can and does thwart the market 
efficiency the laws intend to promote. However, by protecting 
competition, sometimes in the form of propping up inefficient 
competitors, it ensures that market power is not concentrated in any one 
actor. In doing so, it ensures that market power cannot be abused by any 
one actor. The societal goals of avoiding this kind of market abuse can be 
viewed as protectionist. But, are not all laws inherently protectionist in 
some manner? Perhaps not in the sense that they favor domestic firms 
over foreign ones, but surely in the sense that they intend to serve as 
protection for whatever the scope of regulation pertains to—here, the 
markets.   
A further criticism of competition law’s protectionist roots is that 
“competition law might—especially through selective, discriminatory 
enforcement—be abused as a trade barrier.”50 That is true, and further to 
the point of this paper, it may become more likely given the recent 
political climate. However, shouldn’t we be wary of a world without such 
protections? The fact that a law can be abused does not eliminate the need 
for that law altogether. Antitrust law is but a tool that can be wielded to 
support either free trade or protectionist aims.51 It depends entirely on 
those with the power to enforce and evaluate antitrust claims. 
Despite the protectionist roots of antitrust laws, their preservation 
has provided the opportunity for at least some version of free trade. The 
protections afforded to countries through antitrust laws may be the only 
 
 47. See Boudreaux & Dilorenzo, supra note 36, at 83. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Rothbard, supra note 21. 
 50. Tim Büthe, The Politics of Market Competition: Trade and Antitrust in a Global 
Economy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE  
213, 215 (Lisa L. Martin ed., 2015). 
 51. See generally id. 
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safeguards that provide these countries with the requisite peace of mind 
to consider engaging in a global free trade market. One would think that 
the pro-free trade, anti-protectionism critics of antitrust laws would value 
some market distortion over the outright elimination of all free trade.52 Of 
course, this assumes that the critics of protectionism would value any 
course of action that results in some free trade over none. 
D.  Anti-Dumping: The Premier Protectionist Tool of Antitrust 
Anti-dumping policies are the antitrust topic that receives the most 
frequent and stark criticism. Anti-dumping policies allow governments to 
“impose duties [(e.g., fines on a company)] whenever goods are sold in 
export markets at less than their fair [(e.g., market)] value.”53 The policies 
are intended to “prevent firms from price discriminating between 
markets,” especially national ones.54 Similar to the above protectionist 
arguments about antitrust laws on the whole, critics often argue that 
antidumping laws “induce more distortions in the market than they 
resolve.”55 
What sets antidumping apart from the rest of antitrust policy? Why 
is antidumping a riper target for criticism? Although all competition laws 
address market distortions, anti-dumping is the only measure among them 
that does not merely act to eliminate anti-competitive behavior of a firm; 
rather, anti-dumping is punitive in nature.56 A successful antidumping 
claim results in relief that is more severe than a mere injunction or making 
the injured party whole.57  Anti-dumping cases result in the imposition of 
fines and high tariffs on the anticompetitive party, even to the extent that 
the fines or tariffs dramatically affect the party’s ability to continue its 
current and future business dealings.58  For this reason, certain countries, 
like Japan, share the view that anti-dumping measures are the most easily 
abused antitrust tool and a great threat to the preservation of free market 
competition.59   
 
 52. See id. at 220. 
 53. Ian Wooton & Maurizio Zanardi, Anti-Dumping Versus Anti-Trust: Trade and 
Competition Policy, in II HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSES OF TRADE POLICY AND INSTITUTIONS 383, 384 (E Kwan Choi & James C. Hartigan 
eds., 2002). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 390. 
 57. See Anti-dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards: Contingencies, etc, WTO (Sept. 15, 
2018), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm. 
 58. See Elizabeth L. Gunn, Eliminating the Protectionist Free Ride: The Need for Cost 
Redistribution in Antidumping Cases, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 165, 176 (2005). 
 59. See Wooton & Zanardi, supra note 53, at 394.  
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Anti-dumping legislation gained popularity after the Second World 
War, perhaps unsurprisingly coinciding with the declining popularity and 
use of tariffs.60 Today, over ninety countries have adopted anti-dumping 
laws; nearly every country that has antitrust laws has anti-dumping laws 
as well.61 Some experts argue that trade liberalization and anti-dumping 
laws have spurred the rise of anti-dumping measures. These experts point 
to agreements that have eliminated trade tariffs as the cause of these 
adoptive anti-dumping measures.62 See Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Average tariffs and definitive AD measures for non-traditional users 
(Source: Wooton & Zanardi)
63 
 
Even against the “we want free trade” public backdrop of the 1980s 
and 1990s, countries attempted to protect themselves from overt anti-
competitive behavior, like price dumping.64 Any alternative risked losing 
public support for trade liberalization at the first sign of abuse in the 
market.65 One can imagine the public outcry that would ensue if a country 
was unable to respond to anticompetitive behavior. Even the U.S., which 
had traditionally been a staunch advocate for free trade, “imposed more 
than 600 antidumping measures and nearly 300 anti-subsidy duties since 
 
 60. See id. at 385. 
 61. See id. at 386. 
 62. See id. at 384.  
 63. Id. at 390.  
 64. See id. at 391. 
 65. See id. at 387.  
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1980,” each of which were “aimed at correcting what the U.S. 
government deemed to be unfair trade.”66 
A key criticism of anti-dumping policy is that it is used 
inconsistently to serve special political interests.67 In the U.S., steel is an 
“emblem of [the] country’s descent from greatness.”68 American 
steelmakers have lobbied for decades to preserve and protect the domestic 
industry.69 Today, the U.S. makes “half as much as 50 years ago and 
employs just a third of the workers.”70  Past U.S. Presidents made it part 
of their political platforms to initiate trade policies that would limit the 
importation of competing steel products, especially from Europe and 
Japan.71 The Trump Administration appears to be no exception. Although 
Trump recently resorted to imposing tariffs, he first used anti-dumping 
measures to protect the American steel industry.72   
The first trade case brought by the U.S. government during the 
Trump Administration was an anti-dumping case alleging that producers 
from other countries (Brazil, Norway, and Australia) deliberately sold 
silicon metal (a raw material required to produce steel) “at artificially low 
prices in the U.S.”73 The alleged dumping margins were 134.9%, 45.7%, 
and 52.8% respectively.74 After an affirmative ruling in favor of the U.S. 
in October of 2017, the U.S. Department of Commerce (“DOC”) made 
final affirmative determinations in February of 2018.75 
Additionally, on November 28, 2017, the DOC self-initiated an anti-
dumping case against China alleging that China exported common alloy 
aluminum sheets at a low price in order to materially injure the domestic 
 
 66. Kasperowicz, supra note 4.   
 67. See Wooton & Zanardi, supra note 53, at 218. 
 68. Protection American Steel from imports makes no sense, THE ECONOMIST (Apr 27, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21721413-far-saving-jobs-it-will-
destroy-them-protecting-american-steel-imports. 
 69. See id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. See id.  
 72. See Kasperowicz, supra note 4. 
 73. Globe Specialty Metals Files Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Actions Against 
Brazil, Kazakhstan, Norway, and Australia, GLOBE NEWS WIRE (Mar 08, 2017, 11:52 AM),  
https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/03/08/933518/0/en/Globe-Specialty-Metals-Files-
Antidumping-and-Countervailing-Duty-Actions-Against-Brazil-Kazakhstan-Norway-and-
Australia.html. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce Issues 
Affirmative Preliminary Antidumping Duty Determinations of Silicon Metal from Australia, Brazil 
and Norway (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2017/10/us-
department-commerce-issues-affirmative-preliminary-antidumping-duty. 
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industry for that product in the U.S.76 This self-initiation is highly unusual 
and has not been done in more than twenty-five years.77 In its initial 
evaluation, the U.S. estimated that the illegal prices being set were 
between 48 to 100 percent less than the fair market value.78 
These are only a few examples of antidumping cases that have 
affected the darlings of American industry. According to the DOC, 
“enforcement of U.S. trade law is a prime focus of the Trump 
administration. From January 20, 2017, through February 26, 2018, the 
Department of Commerce initiated 102 antidumping and countervailing 
duty investigations—a 96% increase from 52 in the previous period. The 
Commerce Department currently maintains 424 antidumping and 
countervailing duty orders which provide relief to American companies 
and industries impacted by unfair trade.”79 
Of course, the hope remains that the U.S. process continues to be 
impartial and unmoved by political interests. Fairness is an integral part 
of our justice system and serves as the cornerstone justification for the 
imposition of otherwise unacceptable tariffs on foreign parties. However, 
such need for impartiality (in perception or otherwise) has not dissuaded 
special interest groups and political figures from publicly lobbying the 
U.S. Government to make certain rulings. As to the self-initiated case 
against China referenced above, Congressmen, CEOs, labor union 
leaders, and other politically powerful individuals created a spectacle of 
their public lobbying efforts, citing the importance of “protecting” the 
U.S. constituents from “trade practices . . . threatening U.S. jobs.”80 
The perception that the law is susceptible to manipulation based on 
special political interests is partly what made Boeing’s 2017 filings 
against Bombardier for anti-dumping violations, and the preliminary 
findings of the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) in favor of 
 
 76. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce Self-Initiates 
Historic Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations on Common Alloy Aluminum Sheet 
From China (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2017/11/us-
department-commerce-self-initiates-historic-antidumping-and. 
 77. Alex Lawson, US Triggers New China Trade Case with Rare Maneuver, LAW 360 (Nov. 
28, 2017, 4:14 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/989055/us-triggers-new-china-trade-case-
with-rare-maneuver. 
 78. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce Finds Dumping 
and Subsidization of Imports of Aluminum Foil from the People’s Republic of China (Feb. 27, 
2018), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2018/02/us-department-commerce-finds-
dumping-and-subsidization-imports-aluminum. 
 79. See id.  
 80. Chris Veech, Rep. James Comer Says U.S. Aluminum Jobs in Jeopardy, 
TRISTATEHOMEPAGE.COM (Jan. 11, 2018, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.tristatehomepage.com/news/local-news/rep-james-comer-says-us-aluminum-jobs-in-
jeopardy/909831854. 
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Boeing, so controversial.81 Essentially, Boeing brought an action against 
Bombardier, a smaller competitor, alleging that Bombardier had been 
offering passenger jet products at well below its own costs.82 Boeing, a 
U.S. company, was ridiculed in the press and accused of filing the suit 
merely to obliterate a smaller foreign competitor’s growing foothold in a 
product market where Boeing already had strong market power.83 Boeing 
was perceived as a bully and a whiner, while Bombardier, the party 
alleged to have engaged in the improper and anticompetitive conduct, 
was portrayed as a victim. 
The U.S. Government made its preliminary ruling that Bombardier 
had engaged in anticompetitive conduct and recommended the 
application of hefty duties (~300%) against Bombardier as punishment.84 
The preliminary ruling suggested that Boeing was well within its rights 
to bring the claim, despite being the larger and more powerful market 
player. Even still, the international and domestic press toward Boeing and 
the U.S. was pointedly negative. High profile national leaders, including 
British Prime Minister Theresa May, threatened trade wars against the 
U.S. and warned Boeing that continued action could jeopardize its 
contracts.85 Ultimately, the U.S. International Trade Commission 
(“USITC”) reversed its position and issued a decision against Boeing.86 
The surprise ruling, which was contrary to their initial recommendation, 
calls into question whether the USITC succumbed to the immense 
political pressure surrounding the issue.87 
Critiques aside, the benefit of anti-dumping policies is that they can 
be effective even without a supranational system of power. Much like a 
country’s standard trade tariff systems, the duties are imposed by that 
country without requiring any coordination or cooperation from other 
 
 81. Benjamin Zhang, Boeing Scored a Big Victory Against its Canadian Rival, but it May 
Start a Nasty Trade War., BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-
commerce-department-bombardier-tariff-219-trade-war-2017-9.  
 82. See Leslie Josephs, Boeing Loses Trade Case Over Bombardier Passenger Jets, CNBC 
(Jan. 26, 2018, 4:54 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/26/boeing-loses-trade-case-over-
bombardier-passenger-jets.html. 
 83. See Dan Ikenson, Boeing Takes Trade Law Abuse to A Whole New Level, FORBES (Sep 
14, 2017, 4:58 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danikenson/2017/09/14/boeing-takes-trade-law-
abuse-to-a-whole-new-level/#2cc755a110a5 
 84. Vicki Needham, US Finalizes Hefty Duties in Bombardier-Boeing Trade Case, THE HILL 
(Dec. 20, 2017, 6:30 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/365915-us-finalizes-hefty-duties-in-
bombardier-boeing-trade-case. 
 85. See Gordon Rayner, et al., Theresa May Threatens U.S. with Trade War Over Bombardier 
Row, THE TELEGRAPH (Sep 28, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/27/theresa-may-
threatens-us-withtrade-war-bombardier-row/. 
 86. See Josephs, supra note 82.  
 87. See id. 
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countries.88 However, unlike standard trade tariff systems, anti-dumping 
measures are still an acceptable application of a country’s power because 
they are not precluded by trade agreements.89 In light of the recent 
economic struggles of the Western world and resulting protectionist 
views, there seems to be no incentive for countries to subvert the trend 
toward increased anti-dumping enforcement. 
III. PREVALENCE OF ANTITRUST LAWS IN THE WORLD MARKET 
Antitrust, and its proverbial little brother, antidumping, are the 
subject of academic dart throwing, but no realistic alternative solution 
appears to have taken their place. Legislatures seem to have accepted that 
antitrust is the only option to ensure any free trade, as this paper has 
suggested on numerous occasions. Each of the three major players in the 
world economy—the United States, the European Union, and China—
have antitrust laws and enforce them. None show any sign of stopping. 
So, the fact remains that these laws are the reality with which we must 
continue to contend.   
A. The United States 
The U.S. has a long history of antitrust enforcement. The U.S. was 
one of the first nations to adopt antitrust laws through the enactment of 
the Sherman and Clayton Acts in 1890 and 1914, respectively. At that 
time, it was the response to a public outcry for protection from domestic 
monopolistic firms. So, at least initially, antitrust laws in the U.S. were 
highly political, sitting at the forefront of public debate and playing a 
large role in deciding elections.90 As time went on, the public outcry for 
protection from domestic monopolistic firms turned into an outcry 
against international firms.91 The U.S. antitrust system of laws gained 
popularity and clout with its constituents more quickly and gained more 
public awareness than similar laws in other countries.92 
The U.S. system of antitrust laws then began to serve as an example 
of antitrust laws abroad. Setting aside the wide reach of U.S. influence in 
international matters generally, the sheer size of the U.S. market itself 
made U.S. antitrust law something to learn from. 
 
 88. See Wooton & Zanardi, supra note 53, at 2.  
 89. See id. 
 90. WERNHARD MӦSCHEL, US VERSUS EU ANTITRUST LAW, ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-
docs/veranstaltungen/rnic/papers/WernhardMoeschel.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2018). 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. at 2. 
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Although the U.S. spurred on the trend, its antitrust law is 
significantly different from that of other countries in several ways. At a 
high level, some distinctive features of the U.S. laws are the possibility 
of criminal sanctions on bad actors, the automatic trebling of damages, 
and the encouragement of private actors to bring suits.93 Today, over 75% 
of antitrust cases in the U.S. are brought through private enforcement.94 
These features are not common to other jurisdictions. 
B. European Union 
After the U.S. adopted its antitrust laws, Europeans recognized the 
need for their own version of competition laws. The E.U. enacted the first 
collective prohibition on competition-distorting agreements in the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957.95 The E.U. has since set out its antitrust policy in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).   
Despite the fact that the E.U. and the U.S. subscribe to similar legal 
constructs and economic policies, major differences between the U.S. and 
E.U. antitrust laws and their enforcement exist. One such difference is 
that private enforcement claims are nearly nonexistent in Europe.96  
Although the number of private enforcement claims are starting to 
increase, they are being brought at a rate far lower than private 
enforcement claims in the U.S. Virtually all antitrust litigation in the E.U. 
is brought by the European Commission.97 Unlike the U.S., the E.U. did 
not experience the same politicization of these issues that led to public 
support and awareness at the constituent level of its general population.98 
To some, the European Commission bringing most antitrust cases may 
give the impression that the E.U. is more regimented and strategic about 
which cases to pursue than its U.S. counterparts. 
Another difference is that European competition laws do not 
provide for criminal sanctions,99 or automatic treble damages for antitrust 
violations.100 Again, unlike the U.S., public support for antitrust law was 
weaker and less politicized in Europe. This weaker support may have 
made E.U. constituents less accepting of severe consequences for bad 
actors. Of course, some scholars might say that U.S. constituents are just 
 
 93. Id. at 2, 5. 
 94. Id. at 5.   
 95. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 8, at 49.  
 96. See Mӧschel, supra note 90, at 5. 
 97. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 8, at 11.  
 98. See Mӧschel, supra note 90, at 11. 
 99. See id.   
 100. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 8, at 71.  
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generally more comfortable with extreme punitive measures than their 
E.U. counterparts, and antitrust law is no exception. 
On a global scale, the E.U. model has displaced the U.S. model as 
the international example to follow.101 Perhaps the E.U. competition laws 
are perceived as more moderate, or perhaps the E.U. is just perceived as 
a better example of international cooperation. As the E.U. is a trade 
regime made up of many countries that have had to cooperate and 
negotiate amongst themselves, the E.U. laws were already the product of 
many great minds from many countries. To succeed at all, the sovereign 
nations of the E.U. have had to concede on national positions in order to 
form a centralized community position. The U.S. model was not subject 
to multinational negotiations. On the contrary, the U.S. generally does 
not make concessions during trade-related negotiations, and it is 
becoming increasingly clear that the Trump Administration is especially 
unwilling to make trade concessions.102 This may be a contributing factor 
to the perception that the U.S. model is necessarily more extreme than its 
E.U. counterparts. 
Another reason for the trend toward the E.U. model may be the 
perception that the U.S. seems to look more favorably on dominant firms, 
especially given the reality that a large concentration of large firms were 
founded in the U.S.103  The E.U. and most non-U.S. countries are thought 
to be more suspicious of large and dominant firms, and therefore are 
perceived to be more objective in their antitrust analysis.104 In comparison 
to the U.S. model, the E.U. system has been said to have a more active 
government presence, wider policy goals, and less stringent theoretical 
guidelines.105 
C. China 
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”) went into effect in 2008.106 
A newcomer to the area of antitrust, China’s “core provisions of the AML 
were modeled largely on E.U. competition law and, to a lesser extent, on 
 
 101. Bo James Howell, Antitrust Law: Resisting Modern Protectionism in a Global Recession, 
13 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 1, 4-5 (2010).  
 102. See Shawn Donnan, U.S. Anti-Dumping Cases Fueled by Trump Trade Threats, FIN. 
TIMES (May 7, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/fc84be52-31d5-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a.  
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id.  
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the laws of the United States, Germany, Japan, and other countries.”107 
On its face, the law appears neutral; “[i]t subjects foreign and domestic 
corporations to anti-trust scrutiny” and “promote[s] economic efficiency” 
as its policy motive.108 However, the Chinese law is different from the 
U.S. and the E.U. laws in that it widely reserves the government’s right 
to reject foreign acquisitions because of national security concerns; these 
concerns are both  national and “economic” ones.109 
To be fair, other countries, including the U.S. and E.U., reserve this 
right as well.110 However, scholars say that the scope of China’s “national 
security” concerns is much broader than the interpretations of other 
countries.111  China’s antitrust laws, unlike the E.U. and U.S., are not 
primarily enacted to promote market efficiency. Instead, there is a focus 
on national economic security, which serves to protect “‘strategic and 
sensitive’ industries and Chinese national champions.”112 China’s 
leadership has long feared “that Western critics ‘aim to change [China’s] 
economic infrastructure and weaken the government’s control of the 
national economy.’”113 So, the leadership has gone to great lengths to 
avoid these changes. 
China’s political system does not share the same Western 
democracy and rules of law as the U.S. and the E.U.114 Further, China 
does not share the same economic ideology of the U.S. and E.U. 
protectionism. “Market manipulation” is not a dirty phrase with negative 
connotations in China. By virtue of China’s communist system, its 
government bodies are expected to intervene and insulate the country in 
ways that Western capitalists would not. Unlike the U.S., China’s people 
have not been trained to trust a “market” but a government. 
 
 107. International Antitrust Enforcement: China and Beyond: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 
59 (2016) [hereinafter International Antitrust Enforcement Hearing] (statement of Prof. Thomas J. 
Horton, Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, University of South Dakota 
School of Law). 
 108. Anu Bradford, Chinese Antitrust Law: The New Face of Protectionism?, HUFFINGTON 
POST (May 25, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/anu-bradford/chinese-antitrust-law-
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 110. See Foreign Investment and U.S. National Security, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
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updated Aug. 28, 2018). 
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 114. See id. at 66. 
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It is likely that Chinese antitrust laws will never mimic any Western 
economic view of free markets.115 Setting political systems aside, the 
Eastern world’s concept of free trade is more concerned with notions of 
fairness between nations.116  This may explain why China places 
significantly high strategic value on not becoming overly dependent on 
imports. Conversely, the Western view of free trade, at least in theory, 
does not concern itself with national fairness or import dependency as 
much as it does with global market efficiency. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT ISSUES 
Despite the strong propensity towards the adoption of antitrust laws 
at the national level, countries appear to have generally abandoned all 
hope for an international body of antitrust enforcement.117 The U.S. 
continues to withhold support for internationalization, and its lack of 
support has proven to be quite persuasive to members of international 
cooperative efforts. 
A. Failed Attempts at Establishing an International Body of Antitrust 
Governance or Harmonization   
Formal international competition law attempts have failed, in large 
part, due to lack of support from the U.S.118 The first attempt was 
commissioned by the League of Nations, which explored whether an 
international system against cartel arrangements was within the realm of 
possibility.119 At the time, “Europeans looked at cartel arrangements as 
an attempt to preserve economic stability,” and the reports praised some 
cartels as “instruments of peace, international cooperation, and 
prosperity.”120 As a result, the League did not adopt any measures against 
cartel activity, citing the greater good. 
After World War II, it was again argued that there was a need for 
international governing authority over antitrust enforcement.121 World 
leaders and lawmakers sought a new, more cooperative world and 
discussed competition laws during the proposed International Trade 
Organization (“ITO”) Havana Charter in 1947.122 The notes from those 
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discussions contained “detailed rules regarding the substance and 
enforcement of competition law,”123 indicating that it was heavily debated 
and discussed, but ultimately no competition rules were decided upon.124 
The U.S. was among those countries which refused to ratify the 
contemplated competition rules.125 
Shortly after the Havana Charter, nations enacted the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).126 The GATT, like the 
agreements that came before it, remained silent on international 
competition rules.127 This repeated failure to address international 
competition rules in international trade agreements suggests that 
centralized international competition laws may be a non-starter for years 
to come. 
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was established in 1995 
and is the closest entity to a central authority on international trade laws, 
despite the fact that no centralized law exists.128 Again, the Doha 
Ministerial attempted to negotiate international competition rules and 
introduce them into the established authority of the WTO.129 By 2004, 
during the Doha Round of trade negotiations, the plans to adopt 
competition laws were foiled.130 Developing countries and the U.S. did 
not provide their support for the introduction of competition laws.131   
As a result, although the WTO was established to be a primary 
venue to litigate antitrust matters between countries, the WTO can argue 
only that a country unfairly applied their own country’s domestic laws.132 
There is still no international set of laws promulgated by the WTO. Given 
that discrepancies exist even between the three major trade countries, the 
lack of internationally set authority is quite limiting. 
Given these historically failed and haphazard attempts, it is not 
likely that a uniform antitrust law can be adopted globally. China, the 
U.S., and the E.U. all subscribe to varying versions of free trade and what 
constitutes an appropriate method of enforcement. Further still, the 
national values significantly differ between these countries. In China, 
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national security terms and the promotion of national industry is 
paramount.133 Similarly, the U.S., while not allowing for the same breadth 
of application as China in its national security terms, seems determined 
to preserve its domestic laws despite the clear preference of other nations 
for E.U. competition laws.134 
B. Informal Harmonization and Cooperation 
Efforts to informally harmonize international competition laws have 
continued despite the failure of formal international laws. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) 
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(“UNCTAD”) each adopted codes that outlined negotiations and agreed 
to competition law principles.135 The codes were completely informal and 
non-binding.136 Although the OECD’s latest recommendations for 
antitrust cooperation were revised relatively recently in 1995, the 
agreement is still a “law . . . of the softest variety.”137 This is in part 
because Western industrialized nations seek to address anticompetitive 
behavior, while the burgeoning countries are more concerned with 
promoting economic development and regulating multinational 
corporations.138   
The International Competition Network (“ICN”) is another 
institution that encourages cooperative action on antitrust principles.139 
However, the ICN, much like other informal networks, does nothing to 
limit or minimize the protectionist behaviors of countries, which is 
common in the face of uncertainty and lack of consensus on topics such 
as antitrust.140 
Lack of enforceability aside, these negotiations and cooperative 
efforts “established a framework that has been reasonably successful and 
has set the stage for more binding commitments on a bilateral basis.”141 
The fact of the matter is that there is no economic model that is globally 
or unanimously accepted by all nation-states, so there can be no truly 
successful global harmonization.142 To internationalize the law, even in 
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an informal capacity, would require the policy behind the laws to be 
agreed upon.143 How can one agree to perfect and protect an economic 
policy that is not itself uniform amongst all nations?144 
C. Regional and Bi-lateral Treaties 
In addition to informal harmonization efforts, certain regional and 
bilateral treaties have been put in place to encourage cooperation on 
antitrust enforcement.145 In 1991, the U.S. and E.U. entered into a 
cooperative antitrust agreement.146 Other nations have also entered into 
antitrust cooperation agreements.147 These agreements are not 
harmonized, vary widely, and contain different levels of required 
cooperation.148 Yet, they are a country’s best bet for solidifying any kind 
of binding cooperation with another country on antitrust laws. 
V.  CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE AND RISING PROTECTIONISM RHETORIC 
Our current political climate reveals a return to protectionist rhetoric 
and policies. Today, the bulk of protectionism is accomplished through 
non-tariff barriers, such as domestic content legislation and other 
restrictive measures.149 Antitrust is another one of these measures that 
will, at least for the foreseeable future, be a growing and pivotal force on 
the world stage.   
A. Perception of Unfair Enforcement 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, there is a widespread perception 
that domestic countries unfairly apply antitrust laws to foreign firms 
through “unequal enforcement in order to create favorable market 
conditions” for their domestic industries and firms.150 A systematic bias 
against foreign companies would thwart the goal of antitrust and 
undermine countries’ cooperative efforts.151 In nearly equal measure, the 
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E.U., U.S., and China have been the accused and the accuser of claims of 
unfair antitrust enforcement.152 
In the Western markets, China is said to have been discriminatory 
in its application of antitrust law to foreign businesses.153 Even after the 
enactment of its antitrust laws, the consensus by scholars has been that 
China is focused on protecting its own domestic companies and 
industries, and the law is used to create a barrier to entry for foreign 
firms.154 Through the AML national security language, China has 
expressed and codified its perceived interest in avoiding adverse impacts 
to its domestic small and medium-sized enterprises and has rejected the 
“survival of the fittest, markets will self-correct inefficiencies” economic 
theories shared by most Western countries.155 
Not surprisingly, some of the strongest criticism of China has come 
from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.156 It claims that China is using 
AML to “advance policy and boost national champions . . . [through] 
systemic, officially sanctioned curtailment” of rights afforded under the 
laws.157 Further, the Chamber adds that “all transactions blocked or 
conditionally approved to date have involved foreign companies.”158 
Generally, “foreign companies have well-founded concerns about how 
. . . China’s legal framework for antitrust enforcement provides 
opportunities for protectionism and industrial policy to sway 
decisions.”159 Companies and countries alike considered China’s AML to 
be a “newer, subtler form of protectionism, one cloaked in regulatory 
impartiality but intended primarily to promote Chinese companies, 
especially the big, powerful, state-owned companies.”160 
Although the U.S. appears to be quick to make these allegations, it 
is not immune from being on the receiving end of similar charges.161 The 
U.S. has also attempted to preserve its own “economically important 
industries which are threatened by import competition” through 
protectionism on many occasions, though perhaps with more subtlety 
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than China.162 Some academics observe that the U.S. appears to be “less 
keen to go after its own monopolies, although [the U.S.] appears to have 
no problem going after foreign ones.”163 
Even the E.U., who is often considered to be the most moderate of 
the three, is not immune. High ranking U.S. officials “accused the E.U. 
of bias against U.S. companies.”164 Even then-President Barack Obama 
suggested that the E.U. was engaging in protectionism.165 
The oddity here is that these perceptions of misapplication of the 
law have been proven to be unfounded, at least in the E.U. An empirical 
study of over 5,000 cases from 1990 to 2014 evaluated the E.U.’s 
enforcement of antitrust laws on foreign and domestic merger activity.166 
They concluded that the E.U. is less likely to challenge a U.S. or foreign 
acquirer, a fact in direct opposition to what the U.S. has claimed.167 
Rather, the E.U. appears to apply more stringent guidelines to its 
domestic E.U. members.168 The study concluded that while the E.U. has 
engaged in extraterritorial enforcement of its own laws, it has been more 
cautious to do so than the U.S.169 Whether that will change considering 
the recent political climate has yet to be tested. Further, only time will tell 
whether similar studies will be conducted and reveal similar conclusions 
as to the U.S. and China’s enforcement of antitrust laws. 
The fact remains that all countries have nationalist policies. Where 
antitrust laws support the welfare enhancing goals of a country or its 
constituents, it makes sense that national leaders will gladly enforce those 
antitrust laws.170 The question becomes, what happens when the 
enforcement of the law results in less favorable conditions for a nation’s 
constituents? At least in perception, any sensitivity to its national 
constituents will seem like a misapplication of the law.171 As long as 
nations have priorities that are inherently at odds with some other nations’ 
adopted economic policies, there is a risk of a perception of unfair 
enforcement.172   
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B. Outcry for Protectionism, Generally 
Given the lingering effects of the recent global recession, “the cry 
for protectionist policies is louder than it has been for decades.”173 No 
longer are political leaders “willing to subordinate [their] short-term 
economic interests to long-term interests and to the larger good of the 
international economy.”174 Articles far and wide seem to suggest the same 
thing: the E.U. and U.S. populations are hearing about protectionism as a 
far more familiar and welcomed concept as of late.175 
The above-referenced articles, like many published before and 
since, demonstrate a sentiment felt by many observing the international 
political scene. There has been a staunch rise of populist and protectionist 
rhetoric from many nations. In addition, we know from the history of the 
enactment of U.S. antitrust laws that strong political support from the 
masses can create strong effects in republic-based political 
environments.176 Rightly or wrongly, for better or for worse, this 
protectionist rhetoric has changed the political backdrop against which 
antitrust laws are and will be bred and enforced in the near term. 
C. The United States, Donald Trump, and Making America Great Again 
Trump has been long perceived to carry a protectionist agenda. 
Although not an “isolationist,” an extreme version of protectionism that 
very few would expect an international business mogul to have, Trump 
has openly and proudly stated that his focus is on “America First.”177 He 
made countless speeches during his election and since obtaining office 
that have repeated “the idea that America is being taken advantage of by 
other countries and the assertion that trade deals and immigration have 
destroyed jobs and fueled crime.”178 His message has reached the masses 
of the American and international populations.179 His own campaign 
slogan, “Make America Great Again,” cements a message, even to 
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individuals unschooled in antitrust doctrine or other generally accepted 
economic theories, that Trump, a celebrated businessman, finds there is 
an imbalance in the way America had been participating in world trade.   
Trump’s actions so far are nearly as strong as his rhetoric. In 
attempts to further free trade, he has worked toward “getting rid of the 
foreign market access borders that often shut out American goods and 
services, and having stronger enforcement of our trade agreements.”180 
Despite those actions however, he has also continued to criticize former 
leaders for the current trade agreements in place or those potential 
agreements negotiated between the U.S. and various countries around the 
world, especially the Trans-Pacific Partnership.181 Further, he has made it 
clear that tariffs are not something he is afraid to implement.182   
Trump is clearly supporting protectionism through his actions and 
rhetoric, a choice that reverberates as a war cry through the heart of pro-
world trade economists. His statements have fueled several articles 
warning that Trump’s protectionism is perhaps the greatest threat to “the 
system of rules and regulations that has governed world trade for 
decades.”183 Will that come to fruition? Considering his recent tariff 
decisions, it may.184 
D. Brexit and Le Pen in the (former) E.U. 
Trump is not alone in his protectionist sentiments. In March of 2017, 
the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) served notice terminating its participation 
in the E.U.185 While trade relations are only a small part of that which the 
E.U. negotiated on behalf of its members, Brexit still broadly represents 
the U.K.’s rejection of steps toward economic integration in favor of 
making its own decisions on trade.186 Clearly, this decision was the result 
of the U.K.’s protectionist aims. Leading up to the U.K.’s vote to leave 
the E.U. and since, articles conveying protectionist viewpoints have been 
on the rise. For example, it was suggested that coordination within the 
E.U. unnecessarily limited the U.K.’s freedom to run their country:   
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By withdrawing from the EU, we can organize economic and social 
affairs in this country not by deliberate design from the top down, but 
more organically and spontaneously . . .  It’s because we know in our 
bones that it is a daft way to run a whole continent. I suspect it is not only 
the Brits who will soon be demanding the freedom to opt out.187 
By some, coordination with the E.U.’s efforts were perceived as 
eliminating the power of the U.K. altogether: 
And this is the thing with the EU. Once consent is established for 
the basic foundation, the ossification process begins to the point where 
you no longer have the power, reform is impossible and like trade and 
agriculture, it simply drops out of public discourse. Why debate that 
which cannot be influenced? This is how we drift from democracy to 
technocracy—and subsequently stagnation and disaffection. That is why 
I would vote to leave every single time.188 
Supporters even grew concerned that all of the E.U. nations had lost 
their ability to function separate from the E.U.: 
The EU has become too economically and politically integrated for 
its member states to function as truly independent nations.189 
Whether this type of rhetoric will result in further political actions 
toward protectionism within the U.K.’s borders, or was just intended to 
encourage British citizens to vote for Brexit, enough of the population 
seemed to agree by way of a popular vote for Brexit that its parliamentary 
body could manage its own economic affairs just fine without the E.U. 
playing a role. 
On the mainland, other E.U. nations seem affected by a rise in 
protectionist rhetoric. Marine Le Pen, a French politician, led an—albeit 
unsuccessful—campaign for the presidency of France, in which she 
called for “smart protectionism,” introducing the term into the living 
rooms of the population.190 Whether an effective strategy or not, she 
garnered support from “ordinary middle-class French people” in part 
because “protectionism sounds like common-sense economics” as well 
as a job creation plan.191 The accepted and long-term effects of such a 
potential economic plan were not discussed as much as the rhetoric, 
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which proudly touted: “we need protectionism.”192 Although Le Pen was 
not ultimately elected, she brought to the limelight a sentiment of 
protectionism and garnered political support for it, which set the stage for 
the far-right protectionism that seems to be sweeping the politics of other 
E.U. countries. 
E. General Protectionist Sentiment on the Rise 
Although the above represent a few admittedly cherry-picked 
examples of growing protectionism, the WTO has reported that there has 
been a “surge in antitrade rhetoric around the world . . . being 
accompanied by a rise in the introduction of protectionist measures by 
the world’s leading economies.”193 Between October of 2015 and May of 
2016, the major world economies “introduced new protectionist trade 
measures at the fastest pace seen since the 2008 financial crisis, rolling 
out the equivalent of five each week.”194 
The WTO’s warning was intended to raise awareness that the 
creeping protectionism of the 1930s may be rearing its ugly head yet 
again, with the intention of preparing world leaders to avoid the pitfalls 
of such an approach.195 With so many agreements in place that are 
designed to prevent countries from raising tariff levels and engaging in 
the policies which plagued the world economy during the Great 
Depression, it makes sense that individual countries may fall back to 
antitrust law as a lever to promote protectionist policies.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is a clear “conflict between the evolving economic and 
technical interdependence of the globe and the continuing 
compartmentalization of the world political system composed of 
sovereign states . . . .”196 This conflict can breed protectionist political 
views. Unless and until there is a complete paradigm shift away from 
protectionism, which is impossible, the global economy will not meet the 
“rational” assumptions necessary to preserve free market efficiency. 
Some amount of protectionism is inevitable. Although “inefficient” 
in economic and academic circles, protectionism preserves the sovereign 
powers enjoyed by certain countries. In this way, it is a necessity of free 
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trade. This paper is not intended to be a commentary on whether 
protectionism is right or wrong, but rather a demonstration and prediction 
that antitrust law, a tool of political and economic power, can and will be 
wielded by individual countries to promote protectionist policies that will 
affect the international trade landscape in the near term. 
While attempting to act on this protectionism is difficult because of 
the web of international trade agreements currently in existence, 
individual countries may still use domestic antitrust law to meet 
protectionist aims, especially given that an international authoritative 
body governing the use of antitrust does not exist. Countries serious about 
preserving free trade may cooperate with one another to adopt realistic 
economic policies that serve to dull the blade of antitrust law through 
regional agreements, but ought not to attempt to eliminate it altogether. 
Antitrust law, like medicine, must be used appropriately to be 
effective. While antitrust laws generally should encourage free trade, as 
promoting competition is the aim of their enforcement, they are also at 
risk of being used to thwart free trade. That risk is further exacerbated by 
perceptions of unfair enforcement and the divisive rhetoric of world 
leaders. In this way, antitrust law has the potential to weaken the already 
delicate international cooperative framework that exists to foster free 
trade. Absent a change in perceptions and the protectionist rhetoric 
fueling the current political landscape, antitrust law is likely to be 
manipulated to serve protectionist viewpoints, making it increasingly 
likely to become a nail in free trade’s coffin, instead of the key to its 
preservation. It may be a nail that nations are able to ignore for the sake 
of its benefit, or it may be the one that finally puts an end to the pursuit 
of truly international free trade. Only time will tell, but one thing is clear: 
anti-trust law is a field that will impact the international economic 
community significantly for years to come. 
 
